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From NAFTA to USMCA 
 





The renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), now called the United States–
Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA), contains two interesting innovations: the requirement of a 
minimum average wage in the manufacturing of motor vehicles (the Labour Value Content clause) 
and a detailed prescription for the reform of Mexican labour law. Both could serve as models for 
future labour chapters in trade agreements. The assessment contained in this article is based on the 
views of those who demanded renegotiation of the labour-related provisions of NAFTA, experts 
on labour rights in free trade agreements (FTAs) and ethics criteria. The assessment results in a 
split picture. The labour-related provisions came about under ethically problematic circumstances 
and their complexity leaves much room for criticism. Yet, the idea of inserting a wage floor in an 
FTA, as well as monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for ensuring internationally recognised 
labour rights, merits further consideration for future trade agreements. 
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Given the anti-labour track record of the Trump administration (Greenhouse, 2019), it is surprising 
to learn that the renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – now called the 
United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) – contains several provisions that to some 
extent mirror the demands of trade unions in the United States of America (US) and Canada (AFL-
CIO, 2017; Unifor, 2017). Among these provisions, two stand out as novelties: the requirement 
for an average wage level of US$16 for production workers in the automobile industry (the so-
called Labour Value Content clause [LVC]); and a very detailed prescription for a labour law reform 
plus an elaborate monitoring and sanctioning procedure for one of the signatory states, Mexico.  
Both the LVC and the rules concerning the labour law reform could serve as models for future 
labour chapters in trade agreements. After all, trade liberalisation has led to the decoupling of wage 
levels from productivity gains in many areas of manufacturing in high-income countries, without 
any wage increases in most low-wage countries in so-called world market factories (Anner, 2019). 
The latter also applies to the manufacturing sector in Mexico (Blecker, Moreno-Brid and Salat, 
2017). For decades, trade unions have called for the trade regime to be linked to the labour regime 
based on the conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) by means of enforceable 
social chapters (Greven, 2012). Within the World Trade Organization (WTO), such a social chapter 
has found no support thus far, but since the free trade agreement with the Caribbean states 
negotiated under President Reagan (the Caribbean Basin Initiative), many preferential agreements 
as well as bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) include social chapters – from 
twenty-one in 2005 to eighty-five in 2019 (ILO, 2019). In a few cases, trade unions were able to 
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make use of these chapters through creative cross-border campaigns (Kay, 2011), but in the main 
they have thus far largely failed as instruments for enforcing core labour rights (Moore, 2017; 
Harrison, 2019).  
The assessment of labour-related clauses in FTAs is a matter of standpoint. For a long time, 
trade negotiators and mainstream trade economists have resisted the integration of labour issues 
in trade agreements. Even though trade is the result of the international division of labour (without 
such a division there is no need for trade) and is, therefore, intimately connected to labour, issues 
of labour rights and especially of labour standards were kept out of the post World War 2 trade 
negotiations until the early 1980s. With reference to the Ricardian comparative advantage theory, 
attempts to enforce labour rights through the sanctioning mechanisms of trade agreements were 
rejected as disguised protectionism (Grossmann and Michaelis, 2007). Accordingly, authors in the 
Ricardian tradition consider the labour-related clauses in the renegotiated NAFTA as a major 
mistake (Manak, 2020).  
As labour-related clauses became more accepted in FTAs, the debate among proponents of 
such clauses shifted from providing justifications for the inclusion of labour clauses to discussing 
the merits of their various forms (Moore, 2017; ILO, 2019). I will draw on this debate of the 
specifics of labour clauses for an assessment of the labour-related clauses in the USMCA (Scherrer 
and Hänlein, 2012). 
As I have written elsewhere, FTAs favour corporate interests and are therefore to be opposed 
(Scherrer, 2016). Labour rights chapters usually serve as fig leaves (Moore, 2017; Harrison, 2019). 
The question of whether the USMCA labour chapters outweigh the negative aspects of trade 
agreements is beyond this article. My focus here is solely on the merits of the USMCA’s key new 
labour-related provisions.  
The article starts out with a brief overview of the negotiation and ratification of the USMCA. 
It goes on to highlight the weaknesses of NAFTA’s labour-side agreement which the new 
agreement is supposed to overcome. After a brief overview of the USMCA’s remedies for some of 
NAFTA’s deficits, the remainder of this article focuses on the two major labour-related novelties. 
It first covers the Labour Value Content clause, and then the Annex to the agreement which 
addresses the labour law deficits in Mexico. The assessment of these novel approaches to labour 
rights in FTAs is based on desk research, especially on a close reading of the relevant chapters of 
the agreement, supplemented by consulting legal blogs. On the one hand, the assessment of the 
labor-related clauses uses criteria developed in previous research on the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of labour-rights clauses in trade agreements; on the other hand, it presents the positions 
of US trade unions found on the Internet as well as the opinions of experts writing legal blogs.  
The assessment results in a split picture. The labour-related provisions came about under 
ethically problematic circumstances and their complexity leaves much room for criticism. Yet, the 
idea of inserting a wage floor in an FTA, as well as monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms for 




A Brief Overview of the Negotiation and Ratification of the USMCA 
Shortly after taking office, US President Trump began negotiations with the government of 
Mexico, threatening to terminate NAFTA with the goal of updating it. These negotiations 
concluded in October 2018 with the three heads of state signing the USMCA. The text of the 
agreement submitted to the US Congress already contained several rules that would provide better 
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protection for workers in the free trade zone than did NAFTA. Among them were the already-
mentioned Labour Value Content clause and an annex committing Mexico to labour law reform. 
However, there were considerable concerns on the part of US trade unions about the extent 
to which the planned reforms of Mexican labour law would effectively be implemented and 
enforced (see below). The possibility of attending to the concerns of US trade unions in the 
agreement was then made possible by the Democratic Party’s election victory in the November 
2018 midterm congressional elections. The Democrats’ new majority in the House of 
Representatives compelled the Trump administration to negotiate further amendments to the 
original USMCA text. In December 2019, the three countries’ trade representatives signed a 
Protocol of Amendments.  
The changes to the Agreement led the trade union federation AFL-CIO and most, although 
not all, of the US trade unions to support the adoption of the USMCA Implementation Act. On 
19 December 2019, the Act passed the House of Representatives, with 381 votes in favour and 41 
against. On 16 January 2020, the Senate followed suit with 89 favourable votes to 10 against. The 
USMCA entered into force on 1 July 2020. 
 
 
The Weaknesses of the NAFTA Labour Side Agreement 
The renegotiation of NAFTA was a long-standing demand by US trade unions. They were very 
frustrated with the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC), the so-called 
NAFTA Side Agreement, which had been in effect since 1994. It contained no reference to 
international labour standards, but merely obliged the contracting states to comply with their 
respective national labour laws (NAALC, 1993). The NAALC only permitted the introduction of 
measures in the event of a lack of enforcement of national labour law, and in such a case fines and 
trade sanctions were limited to the areas of child labour, minimum wages, and occupational health 
and safety. In addition, the agreement provided for the creation of extended cooperative measures 
and communication forums (Art. 1d and 1e). Although the parties wanted to achieve high labour 
standards (Art. 1f and 2), there was no provision preventing the effective deterioration of such 
standards. Priority was given to national resolutions of labour conflicts (Art. 5:8).  
Sanctions available under the NAALC were very limited and involved cumbersome 
procedures. Complainants had to demonstrate that the government in question was failing to 
ensure continuous compliance with national laws. A single response by the respective government 
to a labour law violation was enough to invalidate the claim of “continuous” non-compliance. In 
addition, appeals procedures took up to 1 230 days before trade sanctions could be imposed. By 
way of comparison, a NAFTA arbitration procedure on trade disputes took a maximum of 240 
days. The implementing authority for the NAALC was not only underfunded, but also lacked the 
rights of inspection and subpoena. (For detailed accounts see Compa and Brooks, 2019: Ch. 3; 
IILS, 2015: 43–57.)  
The Clinton administration had advertised this side agreement as:  
 
[a] way to ensure that Mexican workers would have a fair chance to bargain for a greater share of 
productivity gains, thus narrowing, over time, the wage gap with American workers, and deepening 
the Mexican domestic market for goods and services, including, potentially, those from the United 
States (Harvey, 1996: 4).  
 
However, it did not prevent the outsourcing of US manufacturing tasks to Mexico. While the 
volume of trade between Mexico and the United States has tripled since the ratification of NAFTA 
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in 1994 and foreign direct investment in Mexico has more than doubled in terms of gross national 
product, Mexican hourly wages in relation to the US have decreased since 1994. Real wages in the 
Mexican manufacturing sector were lower in 2016 than in 1994 (Blecker et al., 2017: 98f.). The 
hourly wages of employees in Mexican automobile production in 2017 averaged $7.30 in final 
assembly and $3.40 in supply companies; in the United States and Canada, on the other hand, they 
averaged over $20 (INEGI, 2017).  
Especially the US auto companies took advantage of NAFTA. The Mexican share of total 
North American motor vehicle production increased from 2.5 per cent in 1986 to 20 per cent in 
2018 (CRS, 2019: 15).  
The low effectiveness of the side agreement on labour in terms of strengthening the 
enforcement of labour rights and increasing manufacturing wages in Mexico provides the ex-post 
empirical evidence for the critical claims at the time of its enactment – that is, that its main purpose 
was to provide cover for some labour-friendly Congresspersons to vote for NAFTA and, thereby, 
assure passage of NAFTA (Smith, 1993; Mayer, 1998: 205–18). 
 
 
USMCA Remedies some NAFTA Deficits  
The United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement went a long way to meet the demands of the AFL-
CIO (2017) and Unifor (2017), Canada’s largest private-sector union. It included:  
 
 a chapter on labour relations in the main contract (USMCA Chapter 23) and no longer in a 
side agreement; 
 the reference to ILO core labour standards (ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work and its Follow-Up 1998), but without mentioning the number of the relevant 
ILO conventions (USMCA Chapter 23.1); 
 an annex to the reform of labour laws in Mexico (USMCA Annex 23-A); 
 special protection for the North American auto, steel and aluminium industries through 
higher local content requirements for cars (from 62.5 per cent to 75 per cent), and the 
requirement that 70 per cent of all steel and aluminium used in the production of vehicles is 
sourced within North America (USMCA Appendix to Annex 4-B); 
 a Labour Value Content clause (USMCA Appendix to Annex 4-B, Art. 4-B.7).  
 
As the annex to the reform of the labour laws in Mexico and the LVC are indeed novelties in FTAs, 
they will be described in detail in the following sections. Their assessment follows afterwards. 
 
 
The Labour Value Content Clause1 
The LVC requires that a portion of production wages in the automotive industry must be at least 
$16 per hour; otherwise a duty of 2.5 per cent is payable on import into one of the other USMCA 
countries (USMCA Appendix to Annex 4-B, Art. 4-B.7). It is the first clause in an FTA that 
 
1 Much research for this section has been done by Emilie Segura, with the financial support of the Labour 
Chamber of Vienna (AK Wien). 
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stipulates a specific wage level. The specifics of the clause have been developed by the United 
States Trade Representative (USTR), but reflect demands such as “floor wages to ensure level 
playing field” of the AFL-CIO (2017: 34) and “higher labour and wage standards” of Unifor (2017: 
1). According to insiders interviewed by the trade journalist Jenny Leonard, US Trade 
Representative Robert Lighthizer is said to have often blamed low wages in Mexico for outsourcing 
US manufacturing tasks to Mexico. A clause on a minimum wage would incentivise sourcing from 
US plants and, therefore, would make it easier for Lighthizer to win Democratic support for the 
renegotiated NAFTA in Congress. Mexico and Canada accepted this LVC after Lighthizer dropped 
his original demand for 50 per cent US local content (Leonard, 2018; Lamp, 2019: 28–9).  
The LVC clause only affects manufacturers of passenger cars, light trucks (including the so-
called Sport Utility Vehicles) and heavy trucks operating in North America. The clause is very 
complex and somewhat ambiguous. It does not prescribe a minimum wage, but a minimum average 
wage for a certain part of the manufacturing costs (USMCA, Chapter 4, Appendix, Art. 7.). The 
LVC is meant to be phased in over three years after USMCA ratification (USMCA, Chapter 4, 
Appendix, paragraph 1(a) to 1(d)), but also allows for an alternative staging of up to five years (Art. 
4-B.8).  
The LVC requires automakers to demonstrate that at least 40 per cent of the content of a car 
(45 per cent for a truck) must be sourced from high-wage facilities. These facilities located in one 
of the three USMCA countries can be owned by the final manufacturer or by a third party, and 
must pay an average of $16 per hour or more (not including benefits) to their direct production 
workers.  
If a manufacturer already achieves an LVC of 40 to 45 per cent based on this calculation, there 
is no need for further calculations. If this is not the case, the manufacturer may, under certain 
conditions, claim the wage costs for research and development (R&D), information technology 
(IT) and for engine, transmission and/or battery plants to meet the 40 or 45 per cent quota: for 
R&D and IT up to 10 per cent of their total North American wage costs, and 5 per cent if they 
own an engine, transmission or battery plant (or long-term supply contracts) in North America 
that pays an average hourly wage of at least $16.  
The LVC may be calculated for a model line, vehicle class or production site for passenger 
cars or light trucks. In addition, the companies can choose whether they want to include their entire 
production or only those vehicles intended for export to the North American neighbouring country 
in the LVC calculation. However, the calculations must be carried out separately for the locations 
in the respective countries of the USMCA. The audit must be provided annually (USMCA, 
Appendix to Annex 4-B).2  
It can safely be assumed that the LVC affects manufacturers to varying degrees (Fortnam, 
2018). Traditional US manufacturers are more likely to reap benefits of R&D and IT wage credits 
as well as through the 5 per cent rule for existing engine, transmission and battery plants, than are 
European or Japanese manufacturers whose R&D and IT departments are mostly based outside 
of North America and their engine plants in low-wage Mexico rather than in the United States 





2 The interim instructions of the US Customs and Border Protection for the LVC cover ten pages (CBP, 
2020: Annex A & B). 
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The Agreement on Mexican Labour Law Reform and Implementation  
Another first in an FTA are very specific labour law requirements for one signatory party of the 
agreement, namely Mexico. These are contained in the annex to the USMCA’s labour chapter 
(Annex 23-A “Worker Representation in Collective Bargaining in Mexico”), in the Protocol of 
Amendment to the USMCA (USTR, 2019a) signed by the heads of the three North American 
states, and in the USMCA Implementation Act of 2020.  
The Annex, the Protocol and the Act address three major concerns about the failings of 
NAFTA’s side agreement, namely (a) gaps in Mexican labour law, especially the lack of worker 
representation in collective bargaining;3 (b) insufficient labour inspections and redress through 
courts; and (c) absence of timely and effective response mechanisms in case of labour rights 
violations by a Mexican firm exporting to the United States.  
The (a) and (b) concerns are covered by Annex 23-A to the labour chapter in the USMCA of 
2018. It specifies Mexican labour law reforms as follows:  
 
1. Provide in its labor laws the right of workers to engage in concerted activities for collective 
bargaining or protection and to organize, form, and join the union of their choice, and prohibit 
employer domination or interference in union activities, discrimination or coercion against workers 
for union activity or support, and refusal to bargain collectively with the duly recognized union.  
 
2. Establish and maintain independent and impartial bodies to register union elections and resolve 
disputes relating to collective bargaining agreements and the recognition of unions, through 
legislation establishing (i) an independent entity for conciliation and union collective bargaining 
agreement registration and (ii) independent Labor Courts for the adjudication of labor disputes. … 
The legislation also shall provide that all decisions of the independent entity are subject to appeal to 
independent Courts ….  
 
3. Provide in its labor laws, through legislation in accordance with Mexico’s Constitution for an 
effective system to verify that elections of union leaders are carried out through a personal, free, and 
secret vote of union members.  
 
4. Provide in its labor laws that union representation challenges are carried out by the Labor Courts 
through a secret ballot vote …. 
 
5. Adopt legislation in accordance with Mexico’s Constitution, requiring:  
(a) verification by the independent entity that collective bargaining agreements meet  
legal requirements related to worker support …; and  
(b) for the registration of an initial collective bargaining agreement, majority support, through exercise 
of a personal, free, and secret vote, of workers covered … 
 
6. … all existing collective bargaining agreements shall include a requirement for majority support…. 
That legislation shall also provide that all existing collective bargaining agreements shall be revised at 
least once during the four years after the legislation goes into effect.  
 
7. Provide … that a collective bargaining agreement … [is] made available in a readily accessible form 
to all workers …. 
 
3 For the development and state of Mexican labour relations, see Cook (2007: 182–92), Bensusán and 
Middlebrook (2012), and Compa and Brooks (2019: Chpt. 2 §42 + 43). Concerning Mexican violations of 
ILO conventions, see ILO (2017: 146–9). 
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Andrés Manuel López Obrador, elected president in 2018, and the MORENA Party he founded 
entered the elections with a programme that promised a progressive labour law reform.4 This 
promise was largely fulfilled on 2 May 2019 in accordance with Appendix 23-A of the USMCA 
(Sadka, 2019). However, the extent to which the newly created labour institutions will be able to 
fulfil their intended tasks depends on state budget allocations. Both the AFL-CIO and the USMCA 
commission, composed of Democratic senators and members of the House Representatives, have 
voiced doubts that there is enough funding for such reforms (Curi, 2019). They have, therefore, 
pressed for a renegotiation of the labour chapter in 2019.  
 
 
Monitoring and Enforcement of Mexican Labour Law Reforms 
The AFL-CIO5 together with the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives succeeded 
in obtaining very comprehensive monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for labour rights in 
Mexico. The USMCA Implementation Act of 2020 contains the following paragraphs in Title VII:  
 
(1) The creation of an Interagency Labour Committee for Monitoring and Enforcement 
(ILCME). This committee, under the joint direction of the Trade Representative and the Secretary 
of Labour (USMCA Implementation Act, Sec. 711), is to conduct an assessment every six months 
on the extent to which Mexico fulfils its commitments to the agreed labour law reforms and ‘whether 
Mexico has provided funds in accordance with its commitment’ (Sec. 714). According to the 
Executive Order establishing this Committee, it shall decide by consensus.  
 
The Committee is supported by an Independent Mexican Labour Expert Committee (Sec. 714), 
whose twelve members are appointed by both parties in Congress and the union-dominated Labour 
Advisory Committee in the Office of the Trade Representative (Sec. 732). If, following a multi-stage 
procedure with prescribed deadlines for each stage, the Committee determines that Mexico has not 
fulfilled its obligations, the Interagency Committee should recommend that the Trade Representative 
initiates enforcement action. Such action may include the opening of consultations, the initiation of 
dispute settlement proceedings, or measures with respect to the Rapid Response Labour Panel [see 
below]. In addition, a hotline for Mexican workers will be established (Sec. 717). Furthermore, the 
Secretary of Labour will appoint five labour attachés at the U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico 
to assist the Interagency Committee in monitoring and enforcing Mexico’s labour obligations (Sec. 
721-23). Finally, a task force under the Department of Homeland Security will deal with child and 
forced labour (Sec. 741-44). The Interagency Committee will report to relevant committees of 
Congress at specified intervals.  
 
(2) A Rapid Response Labour Mechanism - RRLM (Annex 31-A) aims to provide rapid relief 
when a factory or call centre (facility) violates the right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining enshrined in the new Mexican labour law.  
 
The focus on a specific workplace is unprecedented. Whereas previous labour rights clauses in 
FTAs addressed the failure of a government to effectively enforce labour laws, concrete violations 
 
4 Key elements of the reform were in line with the demands of progressive Mexican trade unionists, such 
as Napoleón Gómez Urrutia, the current president of Los Mineros, the National Union of Mine, Metal, 
Steel and Related Workers (Gómez, 2018).  
5 On the role of the AFL-CIO’s president, Richard Trumka, see Cassella (2019). 
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in a factory were outside the scope of these agreements. In Mexico, however, this mechanism can 
only be used within the framework of the existing right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining (Title VII (2)).  
The amendment provides for the establishment of a Rapid Response Labour Panel as part of 
the RRLM. It is composed of a pre-agreed list of labour experts, of which one-third will be 
appointed by consensus of both governments. The individuals on the joint list may not be nationals 
of either country (Protocol Article 31-A.3.2). Originally, some Democratic senators suggested that 
US labour inspectors should investigate allegations on the ground. The Mexican government, 
however, resisted this as a violation of their sovereignty, and agreed, as a compromise, to jointly 
form a committee of experts (Curi, 2019). The establishment of such a committee should not 
depend on whether a country has nominated such experts in advance, as this prevents the country 
in which a violation of labour rights is suspected from blocking the establishment of the arbitration 
tribunal by omission (Curi, 2019).  
Complaints about a rights violation can be made directly by a group of workers. The 
Interagency Labour Committee would determine where such a complaint could be filed (Sec. 
716(a)). Upon receipt of a complaint, the country concerned shall first be asked to examine the 
facts to determine “if a complainant Party has a good faith basis to believe that a Denial of Rights 
is occurring at a Covered Facility” (Protocol Article 31-A.4.2). If the defendant country does not 
act, the plaintiff country can initiate an investigation through the Rapid Response Labour Panel. If 
the denial of rights is not remedied within approximately 120 days, the US Trade Representative 
may order the Secretary of the Treasury (who is responsible for US Customs) to impose duty on 
the goods of the factory implicated, or to refuse to import them altogether (Sec. 753). From the 
beginning of the process, the goods from a suspected factory can be “not liquidated” (Sec. 752) – 
that is, penalties can still be imposed on the goods later. Throughout the process, the Trade 
Representative consults relevant congressional committees (Sec. 611 (2), Sec. 714 (b), Sec. 715 
(b)(2), Sec. 716 (b) (3), etc.) to ensure that the process is not solely in the hands of the executive, 
which may be less concerned with the interests of the workers.  
 
 
Do the Labour-related Clauses meet Criteria for Good Labour Clauses? 
As mentioned in the introduction, the assessment of labour clauses depends on one’s standpoint. 
From my standpoint as a labour educator, I am a proponent of labour clauses in trade agreements 
(Scherrer, 2017). Therefore, I will present the assessments by the proponents of the labour-related 
NAFTA renegotiation and by experts friendly to labour clauses. In addition, I will assess these 
clauses using the criteria for good labour clauses developed by authors from various disciplines (cf. 
Scherrer and Hänlein, 2012).  
While over-all US trade unions remain critical of the USMCA (Knight, 2020), the two US 
trade union federations, the AFL-CIO and the coalition Change to Win, supported its ratification 
since their demands for strong monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of Mexican labour law 
reform were met (Curi, 2020). Among the AFL-CIO’s members, the United Auto Workers (UAW) 
and the United Steelworkers (USW) provided only restrained support (Gamble, 2019; Conway, 
2020). A comparison with the position of the International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers (IAM) suggests that one reason for the UAW’s and USW’s support lies in the 
stricter rules of origin and the higher North American local content requirements in comparison 
to NAFTA. The IAM had seen massive outsourcing of aerospace tasks to Mexico but had not been 
able to secure either rules of origin or local content requirements. Even though the USMCA labour 
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rights chapters and annexes contain language in line with previous IAM demands (Herrnstadt, 
2018), the IAM continued to oppose it (Herrnstadt, 2020).  
 
 
Assessment of the Labour Value Content Clause 
Interestingly, none of the US unions were celebrating the LVC. One reason might be that while 
they called for a wage floor, they were not involved in devising the specifics of the LVC. The other 
reason is that they deem the LVC to be insufficient on several counts:  
 
 The prescribed average hourly wage of $16 is too low to prevent car manufacturers from 
outsourcing further production to Mexico. 
 As there is no provision for adjustment due to inflation, the $16 per hour could lose value in 
the medium term. 
 The $16 hourly wage is not a minimum wage, but only an average wage, so wages may remain 
low, especially if other workers receive a higher wage. 
 The clause does not provide a minimum average wage for R&D and IT workers, some of 
whom are paid less than $16 per hour. Moreover, including those sectors in the LVC 
calculation may provide further incentive to relocate R&D and IT functions to Mexico, 
because relocating these high-wage activities technically contributes to raising the average 
wage without increasing production wages.  
 The clause is restricted to the automotive industry, although workers in many other sectors 
such as electronic components and business process outsourcing (BPO) are also negatively 
affected by outsourcing (Drake, 2018; Gruenberg, 2018; Hart, 2018; LAC, 2018). 
 
Of these statements, the criticisms regarding an average wage and the complicated crediting of the 
LVC quota, which makes checking compliance with the requirements more difficult, are especially 
valid. In addition, the $16 average hourly wage’s real value is dependent on the exchange rate. The 
Interim Implementing Instructions of the US Customs and Border Protection determine the wage 
rate at MX$304.31 (CBP, 2020: 14), which is $13.66 at the exchange rate of 24 July 2020. 
 
 
Assessment of Enforcement Mechanisms for Mexican Labour Reforms 
The trade unions welcome the enforcement mechanisms for the Mexican labour reforms but 
remain sceptical as to whether they will strengthen the voice of Mexican workers in collective 
bargaining, and whether the Rapid Response Labour Mechanism will lead to quick responses to 
labour rights violations. Accordingly, they call for vigilance (Gamble, 2019; Conway, 2020). One 
way to practise this vigilance is to participate in the monitoring process. Cathy Feingold, 
International Department director of the AFL-CIO, has been appointed to the Independent 
Mexico Labour Expert Board, as have representatives from the UAW, USW, IAM and 
Communication Workers of America. The House Ways and Means Committee has hired former 
AFL-CIO staff member Kelly Fay Rodríguez to help oversee the Trump administration’s 
implementation of the USMCA (Inside U.S. Trade 2020a,b,c).  
From a labour-friendly legal point of view, the outcome of the renegotiations is assessed 
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positively. Labour experts expect the strengthening of labour rights in Mexico and an effective 
response to concrete labour rights violations among Mexican producers exporting to the United 
States (Charnovitz, 2019; Claussen, 2019; Posner, 2019). However, these legal scholars identify the 
following gaps and ambiguities in the contractual texts: 
 
 The concrete procedure of the Rapid Response Labour Mechanism requires further 
concretisation. This applies to the review procedure in the case of a suspected violation of 
the right to freedom of association and collective bargaining at a workplace, as it is 
particularly difficult to verify compliance with these rights or the possibilities of 
circumventing them (Icso, 2020). It is also unclear how responsibilities for possible 
obstructions could be identified during the review process (Claussen, 2019). 
 There are gaps in the deadlines for the individual stages of the RRLM. For example, the 
maximum duration of the procedure could not yet be precisely determined (Claussen, 2019). 
 The nature of penalties in the case of cross-border services is also unclear; similarly, the 
question of how goods produced by a non-compliant factory can be identified by the US 
customs authorities remains unresolved (Posner, 2019).  
 
The concerns of these legal scholars are a matter of concrete implementation. Therefore, a final 
assessment must wait until the mechanisms are set in place and used. From observations of the 
administrative handling of labour complaints in other US FTAs (Scherrer and Greven, 2001: 62–
7; USGAO, 2009: 52), my concern is that several departments not known for labour-friendliness 
even under Democratic presidents, such as the Department of the Treasury (Bhagwati, 1998), take 
part in the various interagency committees set up to monitor the agreement. Their participation 
might lead to light-handed monitoring. 
 
 
Do USMCA Labour-related Clauses Establish a New Standard for Trade 
Agreements? 
While the previous section identified a marked improvement compared to NAFTA, the question 
remains whether the novel clauses in the USMCA should and can serve as models for future trade 
agreements. An answer to should requires two considerations. First, normative criteria must be 
established. Second, in a different setting the same clauses might have different outcomes. An 
answer to can requires an assessment of the power constellations. 
Let me start with the normative criteria for procedural and substantive issues. Concerning 
procedure, in a widely acclaimed volume business ethicists Christian Barry and Sanjay G. Reddy 
elaborated the following conditions for a morally justified and effective link between trade and 
social standards:  
 
… the system of linkage [between trade and labour rights] must be unimposed, transparent, and rule-
based, applied in a manner that reflects a country’s level of development, that it must involve adequate 
international burden sharing, and that it must incorporate measures ensuring that appropriate account 
is taken of different viewpoints within each country (Barry and Reddy, 2008: x–xi). 
 
If these yardsticks are employed, the clauses fail on the first criterion – “unimposed”. The clauses 
were clearly imposed on the Mexican government by an aggressive, strong neighbour imposing 
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tariffs on steel and aluminium imports on spurious grounds, as well as threatening to cancel the 
previous agreement (Bahri and Lugo, 2020). However, the clauses on the Mexican labour reform 
do entail some reciprocity. For example, Steve Charnovitz, a pre-eminent expert on labour rights 
in trade agreements, highlights the fact that Article 23.3 (1)(a) of the USMCA explicitly mentions 
ILO core conventions. According to him, while ratification of ILO conventions would be the best 
approach, “the inclusion of labour commitments in U.S. trade agreements constitute a second-best 
approach” for committing the United States to ILO conventions (Charnovitz, 2019). Furthermore, 
Article 23.8 (Migrant Workers) requires the US to “ensure that migrant workers are protected under 
its labour laws …” (Charnowitz, 2019). In addition, the Rapid Response Labour Mechanism of on-
site verification pertains not only to Mexican facilities but also to US facilities, though limited to 
those operating under a National Labour Relations Board’s order to rectify their labour relations 
violations. This latter limitation is certainly “a big loophole” (Kimberly Elliot cited by Icso, 2019). 
To what extent the clauses “reflect a country’s level of development” is debatable. As 
stipulated by the ILO, its core labour conventions are valid independent of economic development. 
However, the average wage required for meeting the LVC is, at $16, at least twice as much as the 
current wage for production workers in the Mexican automobile industry. At first sight, this seems 
to be beyond the economic development level of Mexico. At second sight, one might consider the 
high productivity levels in the Mexican automobile industry which would justify higher wages. In 
addition, as only 40 (45) per cent of the labour value content must meet the $16 requirement, the 
LVC might not translate into raising Mexican automobile production workers’ wages to this level. 
On the criterion “transparency”, both clauses partially fail. On the one hand, they are in 
writing and will come along with implementation manuals. On the other hand, as has been shown 
above, they are very complex and contain ambiguities. They are, therefore, not accessible to 
laypersons. Both clauses are “rule-based” yet they leave room for discretion: the LVC by providing 
the automobile manufacturers many options to fulfil the requirement, and the Mexican labour 
reform clauses by leaving the ultimate decision in the hands of US interagency committees. 
The substantive normative question concerns the effectiveness of the clauses. Whether the 
LVC effectively raises the wages of Mexican automobile workers without a concurrent decrease in 
employment cannot be assessed ex ante due to its complexity. The Mexican labour reform clauses 
hold promises of effectiveness because they conform to two key conditions for success mentioned 
in the literature: ex ante conditionality and workers’ direct access to complaint procedures (Gött, 
2018; Harrison, 2019). Concerning the ex ante conditionality, the Mexican government had to 
commit to the labour law reform before the USMCA went into force. Furthermore, a group of 
workers can directly file a complaint to which the concerned country has to respond (Protocol 
Article 31-A.4.2).  
The literature on policy diffusion has pointed out that one type of institution does not create 
a system, “but the simultaneous existence and the pattern of interaction of a series of institutions” 
(Niosi et al., 1993: 218; cf. Scherrer, 2005). In other words, a specific clause in a trade agreement 
might have different effects once it is transplanted into another trade agreement with other trade 
partners. One example from the European Union (EU) may illustrate this insight. Unlike the US, 
the EU does not source substantial volumes of automobiles from one neighbouring country and, 
therefore, it would have to negotiate such a clause with many countries. Even if these countries 
would agree to a US-style LVC, its complexity would overwhelm the EU’s monitoring capacity in 
the face of the involvement of many countries. Thus, before a one-to-one copying of USMCA’s 
clauses is contemplated, contextual differences should be assessed. (For the downsides of textual 
borrowing of labour clauses, see also Claussen, 2020: 8.) 
To what extent can other countries emulate the innovative USMCA clause? It seems that 
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specific circumstances have made the labour-related clauses in the USMCA possible. First, there is 
a path-dependency argument: three decades of developing ever more detailed labour-related clauses 
in US FTAs (Compa & Brooks, 2019). Second, there are domestic actors’ constellation arguments: 
trade unions that are quite united on trade issues; a right-wing president who won office by winning 
over workers in industrial states; and a legislative chamber in the hands of the opposition. Third, 
there is an inter-nation constellation: a developing country heavily dependent on its economically 
and militarily vastly superior neighbour. And fourth, there is again the domestic actors’ 
constellation argument, though this time for the addressee, Mexico: a government coming into 
power on a labour-friendly platform as external pressure needs local actors pursuing a similar 
agenda (Cook, 2004: 247). To obtain similarly labour-friendly clauses, perhaps not all these 




To reiterate, my assessment here pertains only to the novel labour-related clauses in the USMCA, 
not the whole free trade agreement. The concrete impact of the LVC cannot be assessed ex ante 
because of its complexity. What can be said is that precisely this complexity will be a great challenge 
for monitoring adherence to the clause. Furthermore, its scope is limited to one industry. 
Nevertheless, this LVC sets an interesting precedent by naming a concrete average wage level. Since 
the powerful United States has proposed it, such a naming of a wage level may become a point of 
reference for campaigns such as the Asia Floor Wage Alliance (asia.floorwage.org). It would not 
be the first time that a requirement in a United States FTA finds its ways into other FTAs (Claussen, 
2020). 
The likely effectiveness of the USMCA’s Annex and Appendix, as they relate to Mexican 
labour law, is enhanced by its ex ante conditionality, workers’ direct access to a complaint procedure 
and an Independent Mexican Labour Expert Committee. Whether all the measures against labour 
law violations and in support of a greater voice of workers in collective bargaining will lead to real 
improvements for Mexico’s wage earners will have to be seen. While the current Democratic 
majority in the House of Representatives is committed to monitoring the implementation of the 
agreement, decision-making power concerning the handling of labour law violations ultimately lies 
in the hands of the executive. Observations of previous labour law clauses in US trade agreements 
have shown that the use of such clauses, and especially the use of sanctions, are ultimately subject 
to the political calculations of the executive branch (Greven, 2012). 
From an ethical point of view, these worthwhile clauses, which are intended to safeguard the 
rights of Mexican workers and to increase the wages of Mexican production workers in the 
automobile industry, are tainted by the way they were imposed on Mexico. For the USMCA rules 
on Mexican labour law, the blemish may be less severe because of their support by actors within 
Mexico. Nevertheless, it would be preferable if the consensus behind the ILO labour rights core 
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